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APPLYING THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO THE
STATES OF THE UNION
JOHN M. ROGERS*
A state of the Union may preserve its immunity from suit in its
own courts, and the Constitution restricts its amenability to suit in the
federal courts.' Yet in Nevada v. Hall2 the Supreme Court held that in
a motor-vehicle accident case a state cannot claim a constitutional im-
munity from suit in the courts of a sister state.3 The Court indicated,
however, that if a suit involved a defendant state's "capacity to fulfill its
own sovereign responsibilities," different constitutional considerations
might control.4 In vigorous dissents Justices Blackmun 5 and Rehn-
quist6 argued that the reasoning of the majority precluded even this
possibility. Justice Rehnquist suggested that in making such distinc-
tions in the future, the Court would be "truly adrift on uncharted wa-
ters."' 7 It may be, however, that there already is a chart to these waters,
discoverable from the majority's reasoning though not obvious from
the opinion. That chart is the international law of sovereign inmmu-
nity.8
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1970, Stanford
University, J.D. 1974, University of Michigan.
1. The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XI. Most states have statutorily waived or limited their immunity in their own
courts. See 10 CuM. L. REv. 579, 586-87 nn.49-53 (1979).
2. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
3. For other commentary on Nevada v. Hall, see Martin, The New Interpretation of Sover-
eign Immunity/or the States, 16 CAL. W.L. REv. 39 (1980); Stewart, The State as Unwilling De-
fendant: RJqlections on Nevada v. Hall, 59 NEB. L. REV. 246 (1980); The Supreme Court, 1978
Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1, 189-98 (1979); Comment, The Abolition f Sister State Immunity:
Nevada v. Hall and TerritorialSovereignty, 69 B.U.L. REv. 601 (1980); Note, Nevada v. Hall: The
Death KnellofInterstate Sovereign Immunity, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 113 (1979); Comment, Nevada v.
Hall Sovereign Immunity, Federalism and Compromising Relations Between Sister States, 1980
UTAH L. Rav. 395; 48 U. CN. L. REv. 1069 (1979); 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 481 (1980).
4. 440 U.S. at 424 n.24.
5. Id. at 429 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 443.
8. Despite early predictions that suits against states in courts of other states will be rare, see,
ag., The Supremae Court, 1978 Term, supra note 3, at 198; Comment, supra note 3, 1980 UTAH L.
Rlv. at 404, increasing numbers of such cases can be expected because of the Supreme Court's
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I. NEVADA V. HALL
In Nevada v. Hall 9 three California residents were injured when
their car collided in California with a car owned by the State of Ne-
vada. The driver of the Nevada car was an employee of the University
of Nevada, an official arm of the State of Nevada; he was concededly
engaged in university business at the time of the accident. 10 The plain-
tiffs sued the driver's estate, the University, and the State of Nevada in
the California courts." The state and the university were served with
process pursuant to the California long-arm statute for out-of-state
drivers.' 2 The trial court quashed service on the state defendants, but
the Supreme Court of California reversed and remanded for trial, hold-
ing that the State of Nevada could be sued in California courts.1 3 The
court reasoned that when one state engages in activities in another
state, it is not exercising sovereign power over the citizens of the second
state and thus cannot assert sovereign immunity in the courts of the
second state unless the second state confers that right.14 In denying
decision in Nevada v. Hall. Since Nevada v. Hall three such cases have reached state high courts:
Chavez v. Indiana, 122 Ariz. 560, 596 P.2d 698 (1979) (the court found no personal jurisdiction
over the state and thus did not reach the sovereign immunity issue); Carlson Corp. v. University of
Vermont, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 659, 402 N.E.2d 483 (1980) (the court denied immunity to a state
on a claim arising out of a construction contract dispute); Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of
Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574,404 N.E.2d 726,427 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1980) (a state has no immunity, even
as a matter of comity, when the transaction arose from a securities repurchase agreement).
9. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
10. Id. at 411.
11. Id. at 411-12.
12. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17451 (West 1971); 440 U.S. at 412 & n.1.
13. Hall v. University of Nevada, 8 Cal. 3d 552, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). See generally Martiniak, Hall v. Nevada: State Court Jurisdic-
tion Over Sister States v. American State Sovereign Immunity, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1144 (1975);
Note, Hall v. University of Nevada: Sovereign lmmunity and the Transitory Action, 27 APK. L.
REv. 546 (1973); Note, Sovereign Immunit-May a State Assert In Personam Jurisdiction over a
Sister State Without Its Consent?, 53 B.U.L. REv. 736 (1973).
14. 8 Cal. 3d at 524-25, 503 P.2d at 1364-65, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. For this conclusion the
court relied on Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), which held that Alabama could be
sued in a federal court under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976),
despite the eleventh amendment, for injuries sustained by an employee of Alabama's state-owned
railway, 8 Cal. 3d at 524,503 P.2d at 1364, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 356. The Parden Court had reasoned
that by operating a railroad in interstate commerce after the enactment of the FELA, Alabama
had waived its immunity. 377 U.S. at 192. The Parden Court had also, however, relied heavily on
the federal regulatory power the states gave to Congress under the commerce clause in ratifying
the Constitution. Id. at 190-92. Since Nevada had given no comparable power to California, the
California court's reliance on Parden is subject to the criticism that the considerations of federal
power present in Parden have no applicability in the Nevada v. Hall situation' Martiniak, supra
note 13, at 1146-47. Moreover, the waiver aspect of the Parden case has been narrowed in later
Supreme Court eleventh amendment cases. See Employees v. Missouri Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-86 (1973) (upholding immunity and distinguishing Parden on grounds
other than waiver); Id. at 299-308 (Brennan, J., dissenting on the basis of Parden); Field, The
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that comity required a grant of immunity to Nevada, the court held
that other policies' 5 outweighed the policy of avoiding embarrassment
to a sister state.
On remand the trial court found the Nevada driver negligent and
awarded $1.15 million in damages.' 6 Nevada appealed, arguing that
the damages should have been limited to the $25,000-per-claimant ceil-
ing in the Nevada statute waiving Nevada's immunity in the Nevada
courts.'7 The California Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stat-
ing that the California Supreme Court had permitted the suit against
Nevada to go forward based not on the Nevada waiver statute but
rather on the principle that "Nevada's sovereign protection does not
extend beyond its own borders."' 8 The court of appeals also rejected
arguments that the $25,000 limit should apply under the "full faith and
credit" clause of the United States Constitution' 9 or under California
conflict-of-laws rules.20 After the California Supreme Court's denial of
review, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2' and af-
firmed the judgment of the California Court of Appeals.22
Justice Stevens's opinion, which five justices joined,23 noted at the
outset that any federal rule restricting California's exercise of jurisdic-
tion "must be a part of the United States Constitution."24 Before be-
ginning its constitutional inquiry, the Court distinguished two types of
sovereign immunity: immunity in the sovereign's own courts (domestic
immunity), and immunity in the courts of another sovereign (inter-
Eleventh 4mendment and Other Sovereign Immnity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit
upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1203, 1209-10, 1213-18, 1235-37 (1978); Martiniak, supra note
13, at 1147.
15. These policies included the interest in providing a forum for a resident to seek redress,
the interest in assuming jurisdiction when most of the evidence is within California's borders, the
anomaly of precluding an action against Nevada when California would have been amenable to
suit had it been involved, and the suspect nature of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 8 Cal. 3d
at 525-26, 503 P.2d at 1365-66, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 357-58.
16. See 440 U.S. at 413.
17. See Hall v. University of Nevada, 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 283, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439, 440
(1977), aj'dsub nom. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
18. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1, which provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."
20. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 285-86, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 441-42.
21. 436 U.S. 925 (1978).
22. 440 U.S. at 427.
23. The five were Justices Brennan, Stewart, White, Marshall, and PowelL Id. at 411.
24. Id. at 414 n.5.
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sovereign-ie., interstate or international-immunity). 25 The Court,
quoting Justice Holmes, found support for domestic immunity "on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. '26 This
explanation did not, however, support the immunity of a sovereign in
the courts of a sister sovereign.27 Instead, the Court concluded that
such immunity exists only if granted by the law of the forum sover-
eign.28 This conclusion relied on the seminal international immunity
case, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.29
In he Schooner Exchange the Court had held that United States
law controlled whether France could assert sovereign immunity in
American courts. Justice Stevens analogized that California law would
control the question whether Nevada could assert immunity from suit
in California courts.30 Because California law clearly did not accord
immunity to Nevada, the Court turned to whether the federal Constitu-
tion required California to recognize interstate immunity.3
1
Interstate immunity, according to the Court, unlike the immunity
of states in the federal courts, was not considered when the Constitu-
tion was drafted and ratified.32 Moreover, the significant controversies
over state immunity, represented by the cases of Chisholm v. Georgia,33
Hans v. Louisiana,34 and Monaco v. Misssopi35 and the enactment of
25. Id. at 414-18. Domestic sovereign immunity includes, in the context of a federal system,
immunity of a state in that state's courts, immunity of the state in the federal courts, and immunity
of the federal government in either state or federal court.
26. Id. at 415-16 (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)).
27. 440 U.S. at 416.
28. Id. at 416-17.
29. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
30. 440 U.S. at 417.
31. Id. at 417-18.
32. Id. at 418-19.
33. 2 U.S. (2 DalL.) 419 (1793). Chisholm v. Georgia held that Georgia could be sued in
federal court by a citizen of another state because of article III's grant of jurisdiction over contro-
versies between a "State and Citizens of another State.' The eleventh amendment, which was
ratified in direct response to Chisholm, precluded the construction of the federal judicial power to
extend to suits against states brought by citizens of other states or foreign nations. The amend-
ment has been interpreted as rejecting the Chisholm Court's view of article III and restoring to the
states the common-law sovereign immunity the Chisholm Court had held they had given up. See
generally D. CuRmiE, FEDERAL CotnTs 559-63 (1975); C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND SOVEREON IMMUNrrY 46-110 (1972); Baker, Federalism andthe Eleventh Amendment, 48 U.
COLO. L. REv. 139 (1977); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doc-
trines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977).
34. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In Hans the Supreme Court held that even though the eleventh
amendment did not expressly immunize states from suits by their own citizens, the amendment's
overruling of Chisholm required construing the Constitution as leaving the states their sovereign
immunity, even in a federal-question suit brought by a citizen against his own state in federal
court. Id. at 10-19.
35. 292 U.S. 313 (1934). In Monaco the Court held that a state may not be sued by a foreign
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the eleventh amendment, all concerned the scope of authority of the
federal courts to hear suits against states. These cases thus explored the
power that states gave to federal courts when ratifying the Constitution,
not the power of states to subject other states to suit.36
The Court also rejected Nevada's argument that the full faith and
credit clause demanded that California apply Nevada's $25,000 dam-
age limit.37 Reaffirming settled law, the Court stated that when one
state's law furthers a legitimate public policy, the full faith and credit
clause does not compel that state to surrender the application of its law
in favor of a second state's law that would control if the case were
brought in the second state's court.38 Because California had a legiti-
mate interest in fully compensating those persons injured on its high-
ways, the full faith and credit clause did not require California to apply
the Nevada damage limit.39
Finally, the Court considered the theory that the Constitution in-
cludes an unexpressed principle that states shall remain free from suit
in the courts of other states. In forming a single nation, Nevada ar-
gued, the states tacitly agreed to honor one another's sovereignty.4n Al-
though recognizing that the states comprise a union of entities of
limited sovereignty, the Court hesitated to go beyond the explicit con-
stitutional limits on state power and impose a new implicit limit.41 To
do so "would constitute the real intrusion on the sovereignty of the
States-and the power of the people-in our Union."42 The Court thus
concluded that if one state grants immunity to another, it does so
purely as a matter of comity.43
In a footnote to its discussion of full faith and credit, the Court
raised the possibility that its analysis might be limited to cases that pose
"no substantial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative feder-
alism":44
Suits involving traffic accidents occurring outside of Nevada could
hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to fulfill its own sovereign
nation despite the provision in article III for suits between a state and foreign states. Id. at 322-30.
36. 440 U.S. at 420-21.
37. Id. at 421-24.
38. Id. at 422-24. The Court relied on Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493, 502-03 (1939). The Supreme Court has since applied this principle in Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 101 S. Ct. 633, 637-40 (1981).
39. 440 U.S. at 424.
40. Id. at 424-25.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 426-27.
43. Id. at 425.
44. Id. at 424 n.24.
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responsibilities. We have no occasion, in this case, to consider
whether different state policies, either of California or of Nevada,
might require a different analysis or a different result.45
This footnote provoked criticism from dissenting Justices Blackmun
and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun found a constitutional basis for in-
terstate immunity in the concept of federalism.46 Interstate immunity,
he stated, was not mentioned in the Constitution because "it was too
obvious to deserve mention."47 Because the majority had concluded
that there was no constitutional basis for interstate immunity, Justice
Blackmun did not understand how the Court could reach a different
result in a non-traffic-accident case.
48
In a separate dissent Justice Rehnquist asserted that interstate im-
munity was a necessary postulate "to make the Constitution a workable
governing charter and to give each provision within that document the
full effect intended by the Framers." 49 As evidence of this postulate
Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the states ratifying the eleventh
amendment, which closed the doors of the federal courts to most 'suits
against states, must have assumed that they would enjoy immunity
from suit in the courts of sister states.50 Justice Rehnquist also noted
that the same assumption appears in repeated dicta in Supreme Court
cases; 51 moreover, it comports with the theory of Supreme Court cases
that find states immune from suit in the federal courts. 52 Finally, in
view of the majority's rejection of a constitutional foundation for inter-
state immunity, Justice Rehnquist disparaged the suggestion that "co-
operative federalism" may place limits on state court jurisdiction over
another state.53 Should the Court attempt to fashion such limits, he
argued, it would be operating without principled guidance.
54
45. Id.
46. Id. at 430-31 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jus-
tce Blackmun noted, id. at 430, that the Court had inferred constitutional rights from the struc-
ture of the Constitution in cases such as Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to
travel).
47. 440 U.S. at 431.
48. Id. at 429.
49. Id. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist analo-
gized this postulate, id. at 433-34, to the immunity of federal instrumentalities from state taxes
recognized in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that Maryland
could not tax the Bank of the United States).
50. 440 U.S. at 437.
51. Id. at 438-39 (citing Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), and
Great N. Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944)).
52. 440 U.S. at 439-41 (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), and Hans v. Loui-
siana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
53. 440 U.S. at 442-43.
54. Id. at 443.
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It. THE SOURCES OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. Theoretical Basesfor State Immunity.
Both the Nevada v. Hall majority and the dissents limited their
discussions of possible bases- for interstate immunity to constitutional
sources.55 This focus may have resulted in part from the Court's famil-
iarity with the problems of state sovereign immunity in federal court-
problems that turn on the interpretation of the eleventh amendment
and the impact of article Ill on common-law sovereign immunity.
5 6
The majority appropriately distinguished the cases dealing with fed-
eral-court jurisdiction over states from the issue of interstate immunity
raised by the Nevada v. Hall facts. The dissents, in contrast, blurred
the distinctions between the two types of immunity and relied on the
federal-court jurisdiction cases to argue that the Constitution preserved
state immunity in the courts of other states. A closer look at the theo-
retical bases asserted for state immunity in the federal courts supports
the majority's distinction.
Justice Marshall recently argued in Employees of the Department of
Public Health and Wefare v. Missouri Department of Public Health and
Wefare,5 7 that sovereign immunity is purely a state common-law doc-
trine, removable by federal legislation within the article I powers of
Congress. Article III, as clarified by the eleventh amendment, in con-
trast, limits federal judicial power over suits brought by an individual
against a state without the state's consent.58 This theory permits suits
on federal claims against states in state courts,59 but prevents Congress
from subjecting the states to suit by individuals in federal court, be-
cause Congress cannot expand the constitutional limits of federal judi-
55. The Court stated that "No one claims that any federal statute places any relevant restric-
tion on California's jurisdiction or lends any support to Nevada's claim of immunity. If there is a
federal rule that restricts California's exercise of jurisdiction in this case, that restriction must be a
part of the United States Constitution." Id. at 414 n.5.
56. See notes 33-35 supra.
57. 411 U.S. 279, 288, 297-98 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). In Employees the Court, in
an opinion by Justice Douglas, held that Congress had not lifted the states' sovereign immunity, at
least in federal court, when it extended the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1976), to state employees. See 411 U.S. at 285-86. Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority
opinion on Congress's intent to abrogate the state's immunity, but concurred in the result on the
ground that article Il and the eleventh amendment precluded federal jurisdiction over damages
suits brought by citizens against states. Id. at 290-92 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Brennan
dissented, arguing that the states in ratifying the Constitution waived their sovereign immunity
under congressional enactments that regulate state activity. Id. at 316-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. 411 U.S. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 297-98 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has recently indicated that
the eleventh amendment has no bearing on federally created causes of action brought in the state




cial power. Justice Marshall has accepted, however, the theory that a
state may consent to suit in federal court by voluntary waiver of its
immunity.60 The problem with Justice Marshall's analysis is that par-
ties cannot by their consent confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the
federal courts.61 Although an exception for state immunity may be his-
torically justifiable, it is not logically justifiable.
Justice Brennan's analysis in Employees avoided the difficulty of
Justice Marshall's theory. Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Mar-
shall that sovereign immunity is purely a state common-law doctrine,
and that the states gave Congress the power to remove that immunity.
But Justice Brennan approached the eleventh amendment question dif-
ferently, arguing that the amendment should be read literally to pre-
clude only actions against states by citizens of other states or foreign
states. Moreover, Justice Brennan, unlike Justice Marshall, read the
eleventh amendment as an absolute bar to federal-court jurisdiction.62
Under Justice Brennan's theory, therefore, a state must answer to its
own citizens in federal court if Congress so provides, but citizens of
other states are relegated to state courts to press their federal claims.
Justice Brennan's theory thus emphasizes the citizenship of the plaintiff
in determining whether a state may assert sovereign immunity. This
result is difficult to reconcile with Hans v. Louisiana,63 which seems to
reject such distinctions.64
A third theory, supported by Monaco v. Mississippi,65 finds the
states in most cases to be immune in federal court because the immu-
nity is "inherent in the constitutional plan. ' 66 Monaco v..Mississoppi
held that states are immune from suits brought by foreign nations, dis-
tinguishing this immunity (as well as the states' immunity from both
citizens' and noncitizens' suits) from the amenability of states to suit by
other states or the federal government on the theory that in the former
cases, unlike the latter, the plan of the Constitution did not involve the
60. This was the theory of Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), see note 14 supra,
which case Justice Marshall found to approach "the outer limit of the sort of voluntary choice
which we generally associate with the concept of constitutional waiver." Employees v. Missouri
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 296 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. See 411 U.S. at 321-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 294 n.10 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 309-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
64. See note 34 supra. Justice Brennan argued that Hans was based on the common-law
principle of sovereign immunity and not on the Constitution. 411 U.S. at 311-14 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
65. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
66. This is the theory that Justice Rehnquist in his Hall dissent sought to extend from state
immunity in federal court to interstate immunity. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
456 [Vol. 1981:449
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surrender of immunity.67 This theory is consistent with Hans v. Louisi-
ana in basing the states' retention of sovereign immunity on the Con-
stitution as a whole rather than mooring it solely to the eleventh
amendment. Moreover, the notion that sovereign immunity resides in
the states unless the plan of the Constitution calls for its removal can be
reconciled with cases upholding federal statutes that expose states to
suits by individuals.68 Such statutes do not expand federal-court juris-
diction contrary to article III; rather, the constitutional plan calls for
congressional power to curtail an otherwise secure immunity.
Professor Martha Field has criticized the idea that the Constitu-
tion, found by the Chisholm Court to abolish state immunity in federal
court, should be interpreted to require such immunity (absent congres-
sional action).69 Professor Field argues that a more logical position is
that although article III, as clarified by the eleventh amendment, may
not be interpreted to remove common-law state immunity, neither does
that article require such immunity.70 This theory also can explain the
Court's approval of federal statutes that explicitly remove state immu-
nity. Recent cases considering such statutes have involved the exercise
of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment,71 but the the-
ory that article III and the eleventh amendment have been amended by
the fourteenth amendment, thus allowing suits against states under
statutes enforcing the fourteenth amendment, is not as satisfactory as
Professor Field's theory.72 Also unsatisfactory is the older rationale that
a state that participates in a federal program waives its constitutional
immunity.73
Professors John Nowak and Laurence Tribe agree that the Consti-
tution does not prevent Congress from removing state immunity in fed-
67. 292 U.S. at 329-30.
68. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
69. Field, supra note 33, at 522-36; Field, supra note 14, at 1261-80.
70. Field, supra note 33, at 536-49.
71. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 1976).
72. The theory does not explain cases, such as Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964),
that were rationalized on a waiver theory. Moreover, there is no reason to conclude that the
fourteenth amendment granted Congress powers with characteristics different from those of the
powers granted by article I. Field, supra note 14, at 1228-31; cf. Nowak, The Scope of Congres-
sional ower to Create Causes ofAction Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh
and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1453-68 (1975) (examining the question
whether the eleventh amendment restricts the scope of federal jurisdiction over civil rights actions
brought under the fourteenth amendment).
73. See, ag., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). But see Florida Dep't of Health v.
Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 49 U.S.L.W. 3641 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1981) (per curiam); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Vol. 1981:449]
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eral courts.74 They have also argued, however, that the Constitution
does provide immunity from judicially created causes of action---that
is, actions created directly under the Constitution or implied from a
statute. This distinction is based on the states' greater control over
Congress than over the federal judiciary; the argument thus emphasizes
the relevance of separation-of-powers considerations in determining
state immunity from federal jurisdiction.
75
Despite the differences among these theories, they all share a con-
cern with the Constitution's effect on state immunity in the federal
courts, not on sovereign immunity in courts of sister sovereigns. The
Nevada v. Hall majority was therefore correct not to consider these the-
ories in its inquiry into interstate immunity.76 Instead, the Court relied
on a Supreme Court case on international sovereign immunity, The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,77 to determine that the law of the
forum state controls the extent to which a state can assert immunity in
the courts of another state. Although the Court's analysis does not
withstand scrutiny, the reference to The Schooner Exchange does sug-
gest that international law should form the basis for interstate immu-
nity. To examine the Court's analysis, however, it is first necessary to
compare more fully the differing policy bases for domestic and interna-
tional sovereign immunity.78
B. Policy Bases of State Immunity.
The Nevada v. Hall Court accepted Justice Holmes's rationale for
domestic sovereign immunity: "[Tihere can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. ' 79 This
rationale has been challenged as a tautology, 0 and is at odds with a
constitutional system in which the ultimate authority that makes the
law is the people, not the legislature.8 ' The Constitution, which reflects
the people's will, curbs legislative action through judicial review; it is
therefore illogical to preclude suit against the government for the rea-
74. Nowak, supra note 72, at 1453-68; Tribe, IntergovernmentalImmunities in Lillgaton, Tax-
ation, andRegulatio Separation ofPowers Issues in Controversies about Federalsm, 89 HI-ARv. L.
REv. 682, 683-99 (1976).
75. Nowak, supra note 72, at 1441; Tribe, supra note 74, at 694-95. The Nowak, Tribe, and
Field theories are discussed in Comment, The Denial ofEleventh Amendment Immunity to Political
Subdivisions ofthe States: An Unfustged Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1042, 1065-66.
76. 440 U.S. at 414-21.
77. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
78. The Court did look briefly at the purpose of domestic sovereign immunity but failed to
contrast it with the purposes of intersovereign immunity. 440 U.S. at 416.
79. Id. at 416 (quoting Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)).
80. C. JACOBS, supra note 33, at 155.
81. Id. See also Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A.J. 569 (1945).
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son given by Justice Holmes-that the government makes the law-
because the government ultimately is subject to the law.
On the other hand, if the doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity
is limited to actions for money damages-as for practical purposes it is,
in the federal courts at least 82-- then the "law" involved is the law pro-
viding for the payment of money out of the public fisc. When talking
solely about the allocation of public funds, it is not incompatible with
the American constitutional scheme to say that the legislature is "the
authority that makes the law." The Court has never required Congress
to legislate for the payment of damages nor overturned refusals of Con-
gress to authorize such payment. Of course it may be said that this
restraint follows from the sovereign immunity doctrine itself; thus we
return to the initial criticism of the Holmes rationale--that it is circu-
lar.
From the volume and vehemence of the criticism of domestic sov-
ereign immunity, one might doubt that there is an articulable policy in
its favor.8 3 The ability of legislatures to waive sovereign immunity and
place conditions on that waiver, and the inability of courts to do so,
suggest, however, that the purpose of domestic sovereign immunity is
to preserve the separation of powers. The argument in favor of such an
immunity is as follows.
To protect constitutional rights the courts can require governments
to modify their actions in spite of the legislature's desires, because the
courts have a superior ability, through independence and training, to
be objective and to determine the nature of constitutional rights. Decid-
ing whether or not to compensate persons for past violations depends,
however, not on the definition of a right but on how public funds,
which cannot provide for every good and proper cause, should be
spent. This kind of decision is best made legislatively because of the
82. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). For a review of the cases leading to Exparte
Young, see C. JACOBS, supra note 33, at 106-49. See also D. CURRIE, supra note 33, at 617-28. For
more recent cases defining what relief is available against a state official, see Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
When Congress abolished the defense of sovereign immunity in Administrative Procedure
Act suits against the federal government, it expressly applied the abolition to actions "seeking
relief other than money damages." Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721
(amending 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976)). The legislative history of the Act strongly suggests that the
abolition of immunity in suits seeking relief other than money damages was an effort more to
clarify than to change existing law. See S. REP. No. 996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1976); H.R. REP.
No. 1656, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6121, 6128.
See generall, S. REP. No. 996, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-9, 25-26 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1656, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-10,26, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6121, 6124-30, 6145-46
(letter from the Attorney General).
83. See, eg., K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATrvE LAW TREATISE § 27.01, at 545-48 (1958); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.3, at 1610-13 (1956).
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legislature's superior ability to allocate public funds, through its re-
sponsiveness to popular views and its ability to weigh interests. When
statutory rights are involved, it follows a fortiori that compensation
should be at the discretion of the legislature.
That the federal government and many states have waived sover-
eign immunity strengthens rather than weakens the argument. It shows
that legislatures do compare the public benefit of compensating victims
of government torts and contract breaches to the benefit of other uses of
public funds. And even when states waive sovereign immunity, the
doctrine permits the legislature to limit recoveries for sound policy rea-
sons. One example is the discretionary function exception 4 to the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act,85 which keeps litigants from challenging the
legality of government policy decisions through tort suits86 rather than
through the Administrative Procedure Act.87 A second example is a
dollar limit on the amount of recovery, like the limit in the Nevada
statute considered in Nevada v. Hall,88 which prevents the allocation of
extraordinary amounts of public funds without independent legislative
consideration. A third example is the preclusion of jury trials,89 which
seeks to avoid the excessive verdicts that may result from a jury's
awareness of the government's deep pocket. In the federal courts, bar-
ring jury trials in civil actions against the United States is consistent
with the seventh amendment90 because the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity permits the government to require trial to the court as a condi-
tion of waiver.91
The above argument grounds domestic sovereign immunity in the
separation between legislative and judicial functions. The argument
for state immunity in the federal courts adds to these separation-of-
powers concerns the problem of allocating power between the federal
government and the states. One's assessment of the relative competence
of the federal legislature, the federal courts, and the state legislatures to
make compensation decisions depends largely on one's view of the de-
gree to which states should be independent of the federal government.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
85. Id. §§ 2671-2680.
86. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
87. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-558 (1976).
88. 440 U.S. 410, 412 n.2 (1979).
89. See, ag., 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) (forbidding jury trials in cases brought against the
United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976), except for optional jury trials under section
1346(a)(1)).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
91. Lehman v. Nakshian, 49 U.S.L.W. 4835, 4836 (U.S. June 26, 1981); Glidden Co. v. Zda-
nok, 370 U.S. 530, 572 (1962) (plurality opinion); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587
(1941); McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880).
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Intersovereign immunity has traditionally been based on different
policy considerations. The question is no longer which part of a single
government shall allocate public funds. Instead, the question is
whether the judicial arm of one government should have authority to
resolve disputes involving another equal government without that gov-
ernment's consent. The argument in favor of intersovereign immunity
is as follows.
A state perceives its being brought before the courts of a legally
equal state as an affront to its dignity.92 Such perceived indignities may
burden the friendly relations of the two states. A court order of one
government to seize the property of another government in order to
enforce a judgment presents even greater dangers of hostility.93 To
preserve friendly and peaceful relations between sovereigns, disputes
should be resolved by negotiation or by reference to a higher authority.
In the international sphere an individual's claim against a foreign gov-
ernment may be presented diplomatically by his government. 94 This
method both preserves peace and confines dealings with foreign states
to the executive branch, which is more capable and flexible in interna-
tional affairs than the judicial branch.
95
Thus, the justifications for intersovereign immunity do, as the Ne-
vada v. Hall majority suggested, differ from those for domestic sover-
eign immunity. Domestic sovereign immunity involves the separation
of powers in the allocation of funds; intersovereign immunity involves
the peaceful relations of equal nations or states. Accordingly, the au-
thorities one examines to determine the source of domestic sovereign
immunity are of little use in determining the source of intersovereign
immunity. Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Nevada v. Hall looked
to international law to uncover the source of intersovereign immunity.
This inquiry led him to the case of The Schooner Exchange v. McFad-
don,96 the principal authority for intersovereign immunity in the inter-
national context.
92. See, ag., French Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 22, 252 S.W. 124, 125
(1923); The Parlement Beige, 5 P.D. 197, 207, 214, 220 (C.A. 1880).
93. See United States and France v. Dollfus Mieg et Cie. S.A. and Bank of England, [1952]
A.C. 582, 605; The Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256, 265.
94. See Aldona S. v. United Kingdom, 90 Journal du Droit International 190 (Pol. Sup. Ct.
1948) (1963).
95. The French courts are reported to have relied particularly on this rationale. Lauterpacht,
The Problem of Juridictionalmmwunities ofFordgn States, 28 BmRT. Y.B. INV'L L. 220, 234 (1951).
96. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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III. THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE
In The Schooner Exchange v. Mcfladdon97 American citizens li-
beled a French naval vessel in American waters, alleging that the
French had wrongfully taken the vessel the year before. The Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, held that a public
armed vessel of a foreign sovereign at peace with the United States was
immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts.98 Language in
the Chief Justice's opinion led the Nevada v. Hall majority to conclude
that "if California and Nevada were independent and completely sov-
ereign nations, Nevada's claim of immunity from suit in California's
courts would be answered by reference to the law of California." 99
Such a conclusion is unwarranted; indeed it suggests the absence of any
binding international law.
Chief Justice Marshall, in his analysis of the French claim of im-
munity, first pointed out that "The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of
that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign
power."' ° In other words, courts set up by a government derive their
authority from the same source as does that government, and may not,
either practically or theoretically, rule in contradiction of that source of
authority.10' In the United States this means, of course, that the courts
must rule consistently with the Constitution and with valid laws passed
under the authority of that Constitution, even if some other source of
authority such as international law requires a different result. Thus the
federal courts, as domestic courts, must prefer federal statutes to incon-
sistent previous treaty obligations, 10 2 or inconsistent customary interna-
tional law.10 3 As Judge Learned Hand said on behalf of the Court of
97. Id.
98. Id. at 145-46.
99. 440 U.S. at 417.
100. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136, quoted in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 416.
101. Chief Justice Taney put it this way:
Judicial power presupposes an established government capable of enacting laws and en-
forcing their execution, and of appointing judges to expound and administer them. The
acceptance of the judicial office is a recognition of the authority of the government from
which it is derived. If [a state court] decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the
existence and authority of the government under which it is exercising judicial power.
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 40 (1849). See also Adams v. Adams, [1970] 3 All E.R. 572,
591-92; R. v. Ndhlovu, [1968] S. Mr. L.R. 515, 520-23, 535, 543 (High Court of Rhodesia).
102. See, eg., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600-03 (1889) (upholding a Chinese
exclusion law violating an earlier treaty); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Congress may legislate in breach of United Nations Charter obligations).
103. See The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925). Similar rules are applied in the
courts of other nations. See, ag., Croft v. Dunphy, [1933] A.C. 156, 164; Polites v. Australia, 70
C.L.R. 60 (Austl. 1945); Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.I. 277, 280 (Sup. Ct., Israel, sitting
as Ct. Crim. App. 1962).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit, "[A]s a court of the United States, we
cannot look beyond our own law."' 4 Federal courts apply interna-
tional law only to the degree that it is "part of' the law of the United
States.105 In some countries, to be sure, constitutions require that inter-
national law be applied over subsequently enacted domestic laws, but
even in such cases it is because the constitution in question incorporates
international law'0 6 that the domestic court applies it. Thus it is almost
a truism that courts apply the law of the authority from which they
draw their power.
Chief Justice Marshall then observed that any limit on the author-
ity of a sovereign and independent nation must derive ultimately from
the consent of the nation.10 7 This does not mean, of course, that a na-
tion cannot bind itself internationally. If so, there would be no such
thing as international law.'0 8 Instead it means that the ultimate source
of international law, which is found primarily in treaties and custom,10 9
is the consent of nations. Treaties are plainly the product of consent;
the same can be said of customary international law, since custom is
binding because (and only if) it reflects what states deem to be required
by law." 0
104. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
105. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also Triquet v. Bath, 3 Burr. 1478,
1481, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 938 (K.B. 1764).
106. Eg., CosTrruZIONE art. 10 (Italy) and GRUNDGESErz art. 25, 111 (W. Ger.), reprinted in
A. PEASLEE, CONSTrruTIoNs OF NATIONS 501 & 366 (3d ed. 1968).
107. The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and
absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty, to
the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty, to the same extent, in
that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and
complete power of a nation, within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of
the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136, quoted in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. at 416.
108. See A. D'AMATo, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 189-90 (1971).
109. The Statute of the International Court of Justice recites that the court will apply, in addi-
tion to treaty and custom, "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." I.C.J. STAT.
art. 38, 1(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993. This authorization to analogize to the
domestic law applied generally in civilized nations may have been an expansion of previously
recognized sources of international law, and in any event it has not become a major legal resource
for international legal decisionmakers. See M. HuDsoN, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942 610-12 (1943). Other sources of international law such as judicial
decisions and teachings of publicists, are subsidiary means for determining what treaties, custom,
and general principles require. LCJ. STAT. art. 38, 1(d); see M. HUDsoN, supra, at 612-15.
110. The Lotus, [1927] P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 9, at 18; see M. AKBHURST, A MODERN INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-39 (3d ed. 1977); J. BaiERLEY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59-62 (5th
ed. 1963); H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-27 (8th ed. 1955); Fitzmau-
rice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-f54 General 1Jrnc7les and
Sources of Law, 30 BRrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 68 (1953); MacGibbon, Customary International Law
andAcquiescence, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 144-45 (1957). The International Court of Justice
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There are several reasons why these two points were necessary to
Marshall's decision that the French warship was protected by sovereignimmunity. First, regardless of what international law required, if
American law was to the contrary, then Marshall could not find immu-
nity, because the Supreme Court is a court of the United States. Sec-
ond, international law would not require immunity if the United States
did not consent in some sense to that requirement. There is such con-
sent, however, if international custom reflects a general practice ac-
cepted as law. In the next portion of The Schooner Exchange, not
quoted by the Nevada v. Hall majority, the Court discussed this point:
"This consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case, it is
less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction; but,
if understood, not less obligatory." '' Chief Justice Marshall then
demonstrated that international custom required immunity in the cir-
cumstances, 1 2 and concluded that the immunity constituted "a princi-
ple of public law."" 3 Thus The Schooner Exchange found the United
States bound as a nation on the international plane to respect the im-
munity of the vessel." 4 The opinion went on expressly to note that if
the United States required the Court to violate that obligation, the
applies custom "as evidence of a general practice accepted as law." I.C.J. STAT. art. 38, l(b),
June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
111. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136-37. Chief Justice Marshall continued:
This consent may, in some instances, be tested by common usage, and by common
opinion, growing out of that usage.
A nation would justly be considered as violating its faith, although that faith might
not be expressly plighted, which should suddenly and without previous notice, exercise
its territorial powers in a manner not consonant to the usages and received obligations of
the civilized world.
Id.
112. See id. at 137-45.
113. Id. at 145.
114. The English courts have so interpreted Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, see The Cris-
tina, [1938] A.C. 485, 508-09, and, apart from the issue of the extent to which the doctrine is to be
applied, authorities on international law generally agree that sovereign immunity is required as a
matter of international law and is not discretionary with the forum state. Id. at 502; Pauer v.
Hungarian People's Republic, [1957] I.L.R. 211, 212 (Corte cass., Italy, 1956). See also M.
AXEHURST, supra note 110, at 109; 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
333 (3d ed. 1979); 2 D. O'CoNNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 843 (2d ed. 1970); Dedk, Organs of
States in their External Relations. Immunities and Privileges of State Organs and of the Slate, in
MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 425 (Sorenson ed. 1968); Letter from Jack B. Tate,
Acting Legal Adviser, to Department of Justice (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEI'T STATE
BULL. 984 (1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREION RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 63, Comment a to §§ 63, 65 (1965). But see Lauterpacht, supra note 95, at 228-29. In passing the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976)), Congress made clear that it was attempting to conform the
legislation to the requirements of international law. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
7, 8, 22, 23, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6604-06, 6621-22.
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Court, as a domestic court, would do so, but such was not the case."15
The Nevada v. Hall Court read The Schooner Exchange to support
the proposition that if California and Nevada were independent and
completely sovereign nations, then Nevada's assertion of immunity in
California courts would depend solely on California law. 116 The Court
thus analogized Nevada's claim of immunity in California courts to
France's claim of immunity in United States courts. The analogy does
not hold, however, because California and Nevada courts are unlike
those of the United States in The Schooner Exchange in one important
respect: California courts are not truly domestic courts of California in
the same sense that the United States Supreme Court is a domestic
court of the United States. This is because the decisions of California's
high court are appealable to a court that can require California to con-
form to interstate rules: the United States Supreme Court.
If appeal lies from one court to the court of a higher authority, the
first court must apply not only the law of the authority that gives the
court power, but also the law of the higher authority. Since Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee"17 it has been clear that the United States Supreme
Court can constitutionally reverse final state-court decisions affecting
federal rights. The Constitution makes federal law supreme,"" but it is
the mechanism of review that compels a state court to apply federal law
rather than state law when the two conflict."19 Supreme Court review
makes courts of the states also in a sense courts "of the United States."
If decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States were appealable
to a world court, let us say, in the Hague, then the Supreme Court
would be unable to apply United States law that was in conflict with
international obligations. Just as the Constitution makes federal law
superior to state law, international law is superior (in theory) to na-
tional law.' 20 If the Hague World Court could reverse the judgments
of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court would become a lower court
of the international system. International law would then prevail over
inconsistent United States law, and the principle of applying interna-
115. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
116. 440 U.S. at 417.
117. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
118. U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
119. For this reason states' rights advocates have historically chalenged Supreme Court re-
view of state decisions. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 442-60 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER].
120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 3(2)
(1965); see M. HUDSON, supra note 109, at 614-15; Vienna Cony. on the Law of Treaties art. 46,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969).
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tional law only to the extent that it is "part of' domestic law would
collapse.
This very phenomenon has occurred in Western Europe. The
treaties establishing the European Economic Community' 2' create ex-
tensive international rights and duties among the members. 122 Under
traditional analysis a court of one of the member states could not en-
force such obligations in contravention of a constitutional law of that
state. But there are treaty provisions creating a higher court, the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, which effectively reviews de-
cisions of national courts on the interpretation of European Commu-
nity law. 123 In the face of several challenges, the European Court has
consistently required domestic courts to apply Community law despite
the internal law of the member states, even if that internal law is of
constitutional dimensions. 24 On Community law issues, then, the do-
mestic courts have in a real sense become courts "of the Community"
rather than courts of, for instance, Italy or the Netherlands.
But the Supreme Court is not subordinate to any international tri-
bunal, and was not subordinate in 1811 when The Schooner Exchange
was decided. Chief Justice Marshall was correct, therefore, in first find-
ing sovereign immunity to be a part of the law of the United States
before applying it in a court of the United States. Marshall's analysis
does not imply, however, what the majority in Nevada v. Hall inferred:
that sovereign immunity would not be binding internationally even if
United States law were to the contrary. Under Marshall's analysis if
United -States law conflicted with an international rule, the Supreme
Court, as a court of the United States not subject to review, would ap-
ply domestic law in violation of international law. A state court, in
contrast, is subject to review by a higher authority; the Supreme Court
in fact exercised that authority in the Nevada v. Hall case itself. Thus a
state court, unlike a domestic court not subject to review, must bring its
law into conformity with a relevant higher law. The Schooner Ex-
121. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 189,
mandates that Community "regulations," a form of legislation enacted by Community institu-
tions, are "directly applicable" law.
122. See generally E. STEw, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND
INsTrrUTIONS l PERSPECTIVE (1976); R. WORTLEY, THE LAW OF THE COMMON MARKET (1974).
123. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, art. 177.
124. Administrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal, [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
629, 23 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 263; Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 585, [1964] Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 425; see Salimbene, National Sovereignty: Britain 4gainst the European Court, 3 SuF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 185 (1979); Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making ofa Transnational
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Stein, Treaty-Based Federalism, A.D. 1979: A Gloss on
Covey T Oliver at The HagueAcademy, 127 U. PA. L. Rv. 897, 900-08 (1979); Note, The Primacy
ofEuropean Community Law, 15 TEx. INV'L LJ. 139 (1980).
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change accordingly provides no basis for the majority's conclusion in
Nevada v. Hall that interstate immunity exists only if found in the law
of the forum state.
125
IV. THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO INTERSTATE
IMMUNITY
Of course an immunity may be applied in the higher forum only if
there is a basis for it. The Nevada v. Hall opinion can be read to indi-
cate that the full faith and credit clause might require interstate immu-
nity in an appropriate case, although it held that state law controlled
the case at bar. 26 But the Court should have looked to international
law as the law that governs relations between the states, when not dis-
placed by the Constitution or by federal statute. Although the Court
misconstrued The Schooner Exchange, the application of international
law to relations between the states is sound and should govern the ex-
tent to which states possess immunity from suit in each other's courts.
In exercising its original jurisdiction over disputes between
states, 127 the Supreme Court has often applied principles of interna-
tional law in the absence of applicable constitutional or federal statu-
tory provisions.128 The most frequent example has been in resolving
river boundary disputes. 129 Nothing in the Constitution speaks of ac-
cretion, avulsion, or the thalweg of a river, nor does the scheme of the
Constitution indicate how such concepts should be applied. Nonethe-
125. Moreover, there is no indication in The Schooner Exchange that deference to United
States law is required on the particular international law issue of immunity. Marshall's discussion
of United States consent relates only to a determination of whether there is a prior binding com-
mitment under international law.
126. See text accompanying note 45 supra. One might argue that the full-faith-and-credit-
clause doctrine can define the circumstances under which "cooperative federalism" requires state
sovereignty. Such an approach would, however, distort accepted principles that determine when
the clause requires the application of the law of a nonforum state. See text accompanying note 38
supra. In essence, choice-of-law doctrines inherent in the full faith and credit clause are not ap-
propriate for the resolution of immunity claims because the policy bases for rules of immunity, see
notes 79-96 supra and accompanying text, are not the same as those supporting rules on which law
to apply. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 264-78; The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, supra note 3, at
195-98.
127. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 provides: "In all Cases ... in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction."
128. Note, The OriginalJurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REv. 665,
680-83 (1959); c. H. SMITH, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT AS AN INTERNATIONAL TmtmAL
41-43, 51, 83-84 (1920) (argument for interstate common law as the authority in disputes between
States).
129. See, eg., Arkansas v. Tennessee, 310 U.S. 563, 570 (1940); Wisconsin v. Michigan, 295
U.S. 455, 461 (1935); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 378-84 (1934) (extensive use of inter-
national law sources); Michigan v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 295, 308 (1926); Louisiana v. Mississippi,
202 U.S. 1, 49-53 (1906).
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less the Supreme Court has applied international law in such cases.
The Court has also applied international law to disputes between states
over water rights130 and water pollution.131
The constitutional basis for the application of international law is
the provision for federal jurisdiction over disputes between states and
for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over disputes to which a
state is a party.1 32 The theory is not only that the Supreme Court must
apply some rule to resolve disputes between states, but also that the
Constitution contemplates the Supreme Court as a substitute for diplo-
macy and war-methods that sovereign states use to enforce their
rights under international law but that the states surrendered when
they ratified the Constitution. 33 The same analysis applies to any suit
in which a state is a party. Article III of the Constitution extends the
judicial power of the United States not only to controversies between
two or more states, but also to controversies between a state and citi-
zens of another state.134 Moreover, the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court extends to both types of cases.
135
Justice Holmes's analysis in Missouri v. Illinois 3 6 supports the
conclusion that the Supreme Court may apply international law in a
suit between a state and the citizens of another state, as well as in a suit
between states. In denying the right of Missouri to enjoin Chicago's
discharge of sewage into a river flowing into Missouri, the Supreme
Court distinguished between a nuisance warranting an equity suit by
one citizen against another, which would not trigger Supreme Court
jurisdiction, and a nuisance that "might be created by a State upon a
navigable river like the Danube, which would amount to a casus belli
for a State lower down [the river] unless removed,"' 37 which would
warrant an original Supreme Court suit. 38 In arriving at this distinc-
tion, the Court reasoned:
130. See Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 185
U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902).
131. See Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518-21 (1906) (suit to restrain discharge of sewage),
132. See note 127 supra and note 134 infra.
133. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 140-42 (1902).
134. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend.. -- to Controver-
sies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State ...
135. See note 127 supra. The constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court in cases in which a state is a party need not be exclusive. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 119, at 242-43. Congress has made jurisdiction over controversies between states exclusive in
the Supreme Court, but has not made controversies between a citizen and a state exclusive. See
28 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. II 1978).
136. 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
137. Id. at 520-21.
138. The Court found that the harm in the case before it was not sufficiently shown to put the
case in the latter category. Id. at 526.
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In the case at bar. . . there is no suggestion that [Congress] has
forbidden the action of Illinois. The only ground on which that
State's conduct can be called in question is one which must be im-
plied from the words of the Constitution. The Constitution extends
the judicial power of the United States to controversies between two
or more States and between a State and citizens of another State, and
gives this court original jurisdiction in cases in which a State shall be
a party. Therefore, if one State raises a controversy with another,
this court must determine whether there is any principle of law and,
if any, what, on which the plaintiff can recover.
139
Just as the grant of judicial power is used as authority to apply interna-
tional law to disputes between states in Missouri v. Illinois, the grant of
judicial power over disputes between a state and citizens of another
state, which Justice Holmes also mentioned, should be deemed as well
to authorize the application of international law in an appropriate case.
There are two possible problems with the application by the
Supreme Court of international law rights and duties in cases between
a citizen and a state, as opposed to cases between states. First, there
may be eleventh amendment immunity in the former case, but not in
the latter. Second, the statute providing for Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction for state cases arguably does not permit the application of
international law as a basis for reversing a state court judgment.
Under article III of the Constitution as modified by the eleventh
amendment, states are immune from suit by individuals in federal
court, but not immune from suit by other states.14° One might argue
that the Supreme Court, being subject to article III and the eleventh
amendment, lacks jurisdiction to hear a suit by an individual against a
state, even on appeal from a state court: if a federal district court is
constitutionally precluded from hearing such a suit, the Supreme Court
is likewise precluded. The eleventh amendment and the portion of ar-
ticle III affected by it refer to the judicial power of the United States,
and do not distinguish between lower courts and the Supreme Court.1
41
139. Id. at 519-20. The Court continued:
But the fact that this court must decide does not mean, of course, that it takes the place of
a legislature. Some principles it must have power to declare. For instance, when a dis-
pute arises about boundaries, this court must determine the line, and in doing so must be
governed by rules explicily or implicidty recognized. It must follow and apply those rules,
even if legislation of one or both of the States seems to stand in the way.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). See also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 49 U.S.L.W. 4445,
4453-54 (U..S. April 28, 1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
140. Compare Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), with Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
328-29 (1934).
141. The Supreme Court has decided that a case involving a federal issue does not "arise
under ... the Laws of the United States" for purposes of federal district court jurisdiction when
the federal issue may be properly raised only as a defense, see Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908), but the Supreme Court may decide the same issue on review of a
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This argument is, however, implicitly rejected in Nevada v. Hall itself.
If the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the state's petition because of
limitations on the federal judicial power, it should have dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction, regardless of whether, on the merits, the
Constitution required the state to apply immunity. 42 By examining
the merits the Court clearly exercised its jurisdiction. Moreover, not to
have heard the case because of the eleventh amendment would have
produced an anomaly: the very constitutional provisions that ensure
the immunity of states in federal courts would preclude the federal en-
forcement of immunity in state courts.
A better interpretation is that the article III grant of judicial power
over controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State" was
intended to give states a federal court forum, when appropriate, to as-
sert any applicable immunity, whether from state or federal jurisdic-
tion. This approach is consistent with the idea that article III by its
terms neither requires nor precludes domestic sovereign immunity.143
Indeed, it provides an explanation for the language's presence in article
III in the first place. One argument against state immunity in federal
courts, accepted in Chisholm v. Georgia,144 is that the extension of judi-
cial power over controversies "between a State and Citizens of another
State" could not logically be limited to suits in which the state is a
plaintiff. This argument may be refuted by noting that when a state is a
defendant, the federal court should have a limited jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the state has an immunity. In effect, this happens when
any federal court takes jurisdiction to determine whether there is im-
munity. There is no reason why the Supreme Court, in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, should not be able to determine whether im-
munity exists. If the Supreme Court can do so, its authority must come
from the jurisdictional grant of article III over controversies "between a
State and Citizens of another State." The Supreme Court, hearing a
case on certiorari from a state court, is accordingly not precluded by
state court decision, see Louisville & Nashville 1R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). According to
Professor Charles Alan Wright, the only way to reconcile the two Mottle decisions is to reason
that the first Mottley decision interpreted the statutory "arising under" language in the Judicial
code more narrowly than the second Mottley decision interpreted the same language in article Ill.
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 69-70 (3d ed. 1976). Professor Wrights conclusion im-
plies that the extent to which the first paragraph of article 111, section 2, of the Constitution ex-
tends the judicial power of the United States does not depend on the level--district, appellate, or
supreme--of federal court involved. See also Osborn v. United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
821 (1824).
142. In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), for instance, the Supreme Court dismissed the
complaint even though a constitutional issue was involved.
143. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
144. 2 U.S. (2 DalL.) 419, 450-52, 467-68, 476-77 (1793).
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article III or the eleventh amendment from determining whether the
state is immune from suit.
A more difficult problem is that although the Supreme Court may
constitutionally decide on an appeal from state court whether the state
is immune, Congress has arguably limited that appellate jurisdiction to
cases in which the immunity is based on the Constitution.145 The Judi-
cial Code provides for Supreme Court review of state high court deci-
sions "where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of. . . the United
States."' 146 There was little difficulty with the application of this provi-
sion in Nevada v. Hall, for Nevada asserted that its immunity was
based on the Constitution and was, therefore, an "immunity . . .
claimed under the Constitution."' 4 7 If a state argues, however, that a
quasi-sovereign state has immunity as a matter of international law,
and that nothing in the Constitution or federal law supersedes or
removes that immunity, one might argue that the defendant has no "ti-
tle, right, privilege or immunity. . . specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution, treaties or statutes" and that Congress has accord-
ingly withdrawn from the Court's appellate jurisdiction cases in which
an international law immunity is asserted. This too would be an anom-
alous result, for the Supreme Court should be the final arbiter of all
fights and duties superior to state law.
This anomaly does not result, however, because international
rights and duties of states among themselves are in one sense constitu-
tional. If one considers the Constitution to be the resolution of the to-
tality of rights and duties of states among themselves, then the
application of international law rights and duties by the Supreme
Court is a recognition that the Constitution preserves those rights and
duties. In that sense interstate sovereign immunity, to the extent it is
recognized under international law and not limited by Constitution or
statute, is an immunity "claimed under the Constitution." This theory
is supported by Supreme Court decisions that refer to the application of
145. Article HI grants the Supreme Court original jurisdiction without qualification. U.S.
CONST. art. IT1, § 2. While Congress cannot take away this jurisdiction, it can make it concurrent
with lower federal courts. See HART & WEcHsLER, supra note 119, at 242-43. In contrast, the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is subject to "such Exceptions, and under such Regu-
lations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1869).
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1976).
147. 440 U.S. at 414. The plaintiffs in Nevada v. Hall argued without support that under
section 1257(3) "a claim can only be made by citizens of the United States." Opposition to Peti-
tion for Certiorari at 2, 6-7, Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979); Brief for Respondents at 2,
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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international law to interstate disputes as federal common law, 148 and
by analogy to admiralty law. Because the judicial power extends to
controversies between states, controversies between a state and the citi-
zens of another state, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
the Court is forced in these contexts to determine law that does not
depend on the law of individual states. 149 Because the power to declare
the law is derived from the grant of judicial power, 50 the immunity is
constitutional. Just as an issue of federal admiralty law would be sub-
ject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,15 1 even though
the Constitution does not indicate how a particular admiralty issue
should be decided, so an issue of intersovereign immunity would be
subject to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, despite the ab-
sence of a requirement of immunity in the plan or language of the Con-
stitution.
V. THE REQUIREMENTS OF INTERSOVERBIGN IMMUNITY
Even if the Supreme Court should have applied principles of inter-
national sovereign immunity in Nevada v. Hall as federal common law,
it came to the proper judgment. This is so because international sover-
eign immunity has been greatly limited in the twentieth century.1 52
The law has changed from absolute to restrictive sovereign immu-
nity' 53 Complete immunity of one nation in the courts of another has
given way, generally but not universally, to immunity only when the
state acts in a public rather than in a commercial capacity. This devel-
opment has coincided with the development of extensive governmental
undertakings in the areas of industry and commerce, particularly in
socialist states.'5 4
148. See, eg., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). See Note, supra note 128, at 682.
149. With respect to controversies involving states, see notes 127-39 supra and accompanying
text. With respect to cases in admiralty, see Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 157.
58, 160-61 (1920); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917).
150. See HART & WEcHsLER, supra note 119, at 786-87.
151. See Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674, 691 (1893).
152. That the law changes in part because of developments outside of the United States should
not prevent the Supreme Court from applying that law. In changing the law of divided damages
in admiralty, for instance, the Court relied in part on the changes in admiralty law in the courts of
other nations. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 397-98, 403-04, 411
(1975).
153. Lauterpacht, supra note 95, at 250-72; Sucharitkul, Inmmunities of Foreign States Before
NationalAuthorities, 149 AcADAMIE DE DRorr INTmmATIONAL, REcUEiL DEs COURs 87 (1976);
von Mehren, 7he Foreign Sovereign ImmunitiesAct of1976, 17 CoLuM. J. TitANSNAT'L L. 33, 36-
43 (1978).
154. Von Mehren, supra note 153, at 36-37.
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The difficulty with restricting the immunity that had formerly been
absolute was in drawing the line between public activities (acta jure
imperii) and commercial activities (actajure gestionis).155 Nonetheless,
the United States State Department announced in 1952 that in the fu-
ture it would apply the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
156
Until 1976 the courts generally deferred to State Department decisions
about the immunity of a foreign state. 157 The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976,158 however, gave the courts the task of determin-
ing when a foreign state is immune under the Act.' 59 The Act attempts
to codify the current American view of international law, that is, the
restrictive theory. 60 It is thus the most authoritative source for the
Supreme Court to consider in applying international law to determine
whether one state is immune in another state's courts.
The Act provides a broad immunity for nations,' 61 subject to sev-
eral exceptions. 162 The major exception is for actions arising out of a
defendant's "commercial activity" having a nexus with the United
States. 63 The Act defines "commercial activity,"' 164 and the Act's legis-
lative history includes some examples of commercial activity, but the
legislative history concedes that the statutory definition is not "exces-
155. See Brandon, The Case Against the Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity, 21 INS.
COUNSEL J. 11 (1954); Note, The JurisdictionalImmunity ofForeign Sovereigns, 63 YALE LJ. 1148,
1160-61 (1954). See also J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL Sys-
TEM 311-13 (2d ed. 1981).
156. Letter from Jack B. Tate, supra note 114.
157. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34 (1945); Exparte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 589 (1943).
158. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891-98 (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332,
1391, 1441 (1970), and enacting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1976)).
159. H.R. RE,. No. 1487, supra note 114, at 7, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &'AD
NEWS 6604, 6606; von Mehren, supra note 153, at 52 & n.83.
160. See note 114 supra. See also von Mehren, supra note 153, at 66. The United Kingdom,
the last major noncommunist state to accept the restrictive theory, has recently passed comparable
legislation concerning the immunity of foreign governments. See State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33,
reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1123 (1978). See generally Note, The Foreign Sovereign
Immunitier Act of.1976 Giving the PlaintffHis Day in Court, 46 FoRDHAm L. REV. 543 (1977);
Note, Sovereign Immunity-Limits of Judicial Control-The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 429 (1977). See also Note, A Comparative Analysis of the British State
ImmunityAct of 1978, 3 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 175 (1979).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
162. Id. § 1605.
163. Id. § 1605(a)(2); H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 114, at 18-19, reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6617-18.
164. Whether an activity is commercial is "determined by reference to the nature of the course
of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(d) (1976).
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sively precise." 165 Congress contemplated that under the Act "[t]he
courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a
'commercial activity.'"166 Given the difficulty of making the distinc-
tion and the imprecision of the statutory definition, one might argue
that the principles of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act should be
limited to those cases to which the Act is expressly addressed-suits
against foreign sovereigns. But as the courts will need to interpret the
Act for purposes of foreign sovereigns in any case, 167 there is no reason
why the same or a similar body of precedents 168 cannot be applied to
interstate immunity.
The Act has other specific exceptions to immunity as well. The
exceptions include cases in which the foreign state has waived its im-
munity 69 and cases
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for per-
sonal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that
165. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 114, at 16, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6604, 6615; see Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: The Foreign Sovereign Im-
munitiesrAct of 1976, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 399, 404 (1977).
166. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 114, at 16, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6615.
167. Recent cases interpreting the exceptions contained in the Act include Broadbent v. OAS,
628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (immunity;, the relationship of an international organization with its
internal administrative staff is noncommercial); Avango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621
F.2d 1371, 1378-80 (5th Cir. 1980) (tourists expelled from the Dominican Republic; immunity for
false imprisonment and battery claims but no immunity for nonperformance of a contract for a
vacation tour); United Euram Corp. v. USSR, 461 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no immunity;
contracting for the organizing of concerts under a cultural exchange agreement is "commercial
activity"); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 394-96 (D. DeL 1978) (no immu-
nity; antitrust violations may be "commercial activity"); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic
of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no immunity; the activity was commercial
despite the military purpose of the contract), aJ'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Yessenin-Volpin v.
Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (immunity; publication of the asserted
defamatory statements by an official government press agency is not a "commercial activity").
Several cases have also dealt with whether concededly commercial activity had a sufficient
nexus with the United States. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir.
1980) (no immunity); Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (immunity).
See generaly Comment, Recent Developments in Anglo-American Doctrine of Foreign Sover-
eign Immunit,, 5 IN'L TRADE LJ. 298, 312-17 (1980); Note, "CommercialActivity"in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of(1976, 14 J. Ir'L. L. & EcoN. 163 (1979).
168. The immunity determinations of the Department of State between the time of the Tate
letter, supra note 114, and the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act have been in-
dexed and made public. . BoYD, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1017-89 (1977).
The Court is forced to make distinctions between sovereign and nonsovereign functions in
other contexts as well. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (hold-
ing that federal minimum-wage laws may not be applied to states in ways that interfere with the
states' capacity to perform their sovereign functions).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).
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foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while
acting within the scope of his office or employment .... 170
This exception, though perhaps not as precise as it might be, 171 was
"directed primarily at the problem of traffic accidents,"'172 and clearly
would apply by analogy to the claim arising out of the traffic accident
in Nevada v. Hall. The exception comports with international law
precedents; 73 in fact, the plaintiffs in Nevada v. Hall argued that in the
circumstances of a traffic accident "the State of Nevada does not carry
with it any of the attributes of sovereignty nor exercise of governmental
power."' 174 The absence of sovereign functions, as defined by interna-
tional law, is the soundest basis for the holding in Nevada v. Hall. In-
ternational law balances a state government's interest in protecting and
preserving its sovereignty against the interests of victims of a govern-
ment tortfeasor who acts as a private individual might. Certainly in
Nevada v. Hall the balance was in favor of the victim.
Some other case, however, could involve the state's "capacity to
fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities," to use the language of the Ne-
vada v. Hall majority's footnote. 175 In such a case the state should be
immune, and its immunity may logically be enforced by the application
of international law principles. The principles may have to be modified
because of the differences between the sovereignty of nations and the
quasi-sovereignty of our states, 176 but this necessary modification does
not imply the absence of an enforceable immunity to protect the inter-
ests of a sovereign state to the extent that it does have sovereign respon-
sibilities.
170. Id. § 1605(a)(5). Excluded from the scope of these exemptions are claims based on the
exercise of a discretionary function and for certain intentional torts. Id.
171. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (no immunity;
political assassination is not within the discretionary function exclusion).
172. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 114, at 20, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6604, 6619.
173. See, eg., Collision with Foreign Government-Owned Motor Car, 40 I.L.R 73 (Sup. Ct.,
Aus., 1961).
174. Brief for Respondents, supra note 147, at 9. The plaintiffs argued both that the mere
operation of an automobile does not amount to a sovereign function, and that the activity in-
volved (the delivery of television parts) was not so important as to override California's interest in
highway safety and in affording a remedy for injured residents. Id.
175. 440 U.S. at 424 n.24. An example might be a case involving a state-government em-
ployer-employee dispute; f. Broadbent v. OAS, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dismissal of staff
members of the OAS Secretariat is shielded by the doctrine of immunity).
176. For example, unlike sovereign states, states of the United States do not conduct diplo-




The international law of sovereign immunity now balances the in-
terest of a sovereign state in avoiding undue interference with its gov-
ernmental functions by other states with the interests of parties harmed
by states acting indistinguishably from private persons. A similar bal-
ancing is needed with respect to the quasi-sovereign states of the
United States. Such a balancing meets the concern of the majority in
Nevada v. Hall of protecting the interests of the state in which the traf-
fic accident occurred, without, as the dissent feared, eliminating a
sound theoretical basis for limiting the holding. The theoretical basis,
moreover, is not bound up with eleventh amendment doctrines devel-
oped to allocate power between the federal government and the states
rather than among the states themselves. Instead it is based on the na-
ture of our Union as a federation of quasi-sovereign states that, unlike
most sovereign nations today, are subject to enforceable intersovereign
rules of law by the court of a higher authority: the Supreme Court of
the United States.
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